Saturday, February 29

GIORNALISTI COMPRATI DA DECENNI

Il 13 gennaio 2017, è morto Udo Ulfkotte.A causa di un infarto cardiaco, apparentemente, sebbene l’immediata cremazione del corpo e l’assenza di un’autopsia non mancheranno di alimentare, proprio per lui che è sempre stato descritto come un teorico della cospirazione, gravi dubbi sulle reali cause della sua morte. 

Nato nel 1960 a Lippstadt in Vestfalia studiò diritto e scienze politiche all’Università di Friburgo dove ottenne il dottorato di ricerca con una dissertazione sulla politica americana e sovietica nel Medio Oriente

Nel 1986 entrò alla redazione della Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) dove fu per anni corrispondente dall’estero ed acquisì una profonda conoscenza di decine di Paesi, specie in Medio Oriente. 

In quegli anni, così riferì lo stesso Udo Ulfkotte in un’intervista a Russia Today e nel suo recente libro dedicato al tema, egli partecipò a un diffuso sistema di corruttela dei giornalisti tedeschi,indotti da prebende e pressioni a diffondere notizie la cui finalità non era tanto quella di raccontare la verità, quanto quella…di Alessandro Fusillo

POLITICIANS, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY & HIGH FINANCE CONTROL EUROPE MASS MEDIA



Udo Ulfkotte (Lippstadt, 20 January 1960 - 13 January 2017) was a German journalist. He worked as a publisher for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) newspaper.

Udo Ulfkotte became famous in 2014 with the publication of the book Gekaufte Journalisten, "Journalists bought" in which he revealed that he had been in the pay of the CIA and therefore of the USA for 17 years and as the CIA itself and other Secret Service Agencies 
(between CIA , MI6, DB, DSE, to which the Bundesnachrichtendienst BND, German Intelligence) pay money to Western journalists to put some news in a light favorable to them, when not openly propaganda or pro-NATO, suggesting to these journalists that they could easily lose their job in the media if they did not respect the "pro-western agenda".

Having confessed to being sick and near death, he would have decided to unravel the intrigues and agreements currently existing and hidden on which world and European society is based.


Ulfkotte was on the staff of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation from 1999 to 2003. He won the civic prize of the Annette Barthelt Foundation in 2003. Ulfkotte published a magazine called Whistleblower, reporting on topics not covered by the German media.



The BDB merged with Ulfkotte's Pax Europa organisation to form Bürgerbewegung Pax Europa, but Ulfkotte left this in 2008 after an internal dispute. Pax Europa was affiliated to the anti-Muslim Stop Islamisation of Europe (SIOE) alliance and approached the far-right Belgian party Vlaams Belang (VB) for their assistance.
It worked with them to organise an anti-Islamic 9/11 anniversary march in Brussels in 2007, but mayor Freddy Thielemans refused to licence it and it was eventually cancelled, leading to a split between Ulfkotte and SIOE.[14]

Ulfkotte had planned to run for the Hamburg local elections in 2008, as number two on the Centre Party's list,[15] but later withdrew in June/July 2007. In July 2007, Ulfkotte announced he would found a new national party,[13] but this effort failed.

Ulfkotte was a speaker at rallies of the right-wing anti-Islam Pegida movement  and the right-wing party AfD.

In 2014, Ulfkotte published the book Gekaufte Journalisten (German Bought Journalists: How Politicians, Intelligence Agencies and High Finance Control Germany’s Mass Media), in which he stated that the CIA and other secret services pay money to journalists to report stories in a certain light. 

According to Ulfkotte, the CIA and German intelligence (BND) bribe journalists in Germany to write pro-NATO propaganda articles, and it is well understood that one may lose their media job if they fail to comply with the pro-Western agenda. This is part of a larger pattern of media corruption he describes in the book. The first English edition of the book, "Journalists for Hire," was never published, leading to speculation the book had been suppressed or "privished." 

A new translation was finally released under the title "Presstitutes" Der Spiegel noted that "Ulfkotte's book was published by Kopp, a melting pot for conspiracy theorists. Kopp publishes works by ufologists, and by authors who claim the Americans destroyed the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center themselves in 2001. 

Ulfkotte's book was on the bestseller lists for months. "Bought Journalists" is the bible of all those who have renounced their faith in the German media. Ulfkotte's critics see the book as a vendetta against the FAZ, which he left on bad terms."

Ulfkotte died from a heart attack on 13 January 2017 at the age of 56. In April 2017, Jonas Schneider published an e-book which alleges that Ulfkotte's death was a concealed murder.

Tuesday, February 4

BUSH TWO DESTROYD NORTH AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST

Why Did Bush Go to War in Iraq? The Answer Is More Sinister Than You Think

Donald-Rumsfeld-President-George-W.-Bush-and-Vice-President-Dick-Cheney

Seventeen years after the United States invaded Iraq and left a trail of destruction and chaos in the country and the region, one aspect of the war remains criminally underexamined: why was it fought in the first place? What did the Bush administration hope to get out of the war?

The official, and widely-accepted, story remains that Washington was motivated by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme. His nuclear capabilities, especially, were deemed sufficiently alarming to incite the war. As then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, “We do not want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”

Despite Saddam not having an active WMD programme, this explanation has found support among some International Relations scholars, who say that while the Bush administration was wrong about Saddam’s WMD capabilities, it was sincerely wrong. Intelligence is a complicated, murky enterprise, the argument goes, and given the foreboding shadow of the 9/11 attacks, the US government reasonably, if tragically, misread the evidence on the dangers Saddam posed.
There is a major problem with this thesis: there is no evidence for it, beyond the words of the Bush officials themselves. And since we know the administration was engaged in a widespread campaign of deception and propaganda in the run-up to the Iraq war, there is little reason to believe them.

My investigation into the causes of the war finds that it had little to do with fear of WMDs – or other purported goals, such as a desire to “spread democracy” or satisfy the oil or Israel lobbies. Rather, the Bush administration invaded Iraq for its demonstration effect.

"A quick and decisive victory in the heart of the Arab world would send a message to all countries, especially to recalcitrant regimes such as Syria, Libya, Iran, or North Korea, that American hegemony was here to stay. Put simply, the Iraq war was motivated by a desire to (re)establish American standing as the world’s leading power."

Indeed, even before 9/11, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld saw Iraq through the prism of status and reputation, variously arguing in February and July 2001 that ousting Saddam would “enhance US credibility and influence throughout the region” and “demonstrate what US policy is all about”.

These hypotheticals were catalysed into reality by September 11, when symbols of American military and economic dominance were destroyed. Driven by humiliation, the Bush administration felt that the US needed to reassert its position as an unchallengeable hegemon.

The only way to send a message so menacing was a swashbuckling victory in war. Crucially, however, Afghanistan was not enough: it was simply too weak a state. As prison bullies know, a fearsome reputation is not acquired by beating up the weakest in the yard. Or as Rumsfeld put it on the evening of 9/11, “We need to bomb something else to prove that we’re, you know, big and strong and not going to be pushed around by these kinds of attacks.”

Moreover, Afghanistan was a “fair” war, a tit-for-tat response to the Taliban’s provision of sanctuary to al-Qaeda’s leadership. Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith considered restricting retaliation to Afghanistan dangerously “limited”, “meager”, and “narrow”. Doing so, they alleged, “may be perceived as a sign of weakness rather than strength” and prove to “embolden rather than discourage regimes” opposed to the US. They knew that sending a message of unbridled hegemony entailed a disproportionate response to 9/11, one that had to extend beyond Afghanistan.

Iraq fit the bill both because it was more powerful than Afghanistan and because it had been in neoconservative crosshairs since George HW Bush declined to press on to Baghdad in 1991. A regime remaining defiant despite a military defeat was barely tolerable before 9/11. Afterwards, however, it became untenable.

That Iraq was attacked for its demonstration effect is attested to by several sources, not least the principals themselves – in private. A senior administration official told a reporter, off the record, that “Iraq is not just about Iraq”, rather “it was of a type”, including Iran, Syria, and North Korea.

In a memo issued on September 30, 2001, Rumsfeld advised Bush that “the USG [US government] should envision a goal along these lines: New regimes in Afghanistan and another key State [or two] that supports terrorism [to strengthen political and military efforts to change policies elsewhere]”.

Feith wrote to Rumsfeld in October 2001 that action against Iraq would make it easier to “confront – politically, militarily, or otherwise” Libya and Syria. As for then-Vice President Dick Cheney, one close adviser revealed that his thinking behind the war was to show: “We are able and willing to strike at someone. That sends a very powerful message.”

In a 2002 column, Jonah Goldberg coined the “Ledeen Doctrine”, named after neoconservative historian Michael Ledeen. The “doctrine” states: “Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business.”

It may be discomfiting to Americans to say nothing of millions of Iraqis that the Bush administration spent their blood and treasure for a war inspired by the Ledeen Doctrine. Did the US really start a war – one that cost trillions of dollars, killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, destabilised the region, and helped create the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – just to prove a point?

More uncomfortable still is that the Bush administration used WMDs as a cover, with equal parts fearmongering and strategic misrepresentation – lying – to exact the desired political effect. Indeed, some US economists consider the notion that the Bush administration deliberately misled the country and the globe into war in Iraq to be a “conspiracy theory”, on par with beliefs that President Barack Obama was born outside the US or that the Holocaust did not occur.

But this, sadly, is no conspiracy theory. Even Bush officials have sometimes dropped their guard. Feith confessed in 2006 that “the rationale for the war didn’t hinge on the details of this intelligence even though the details of the intelligence at times became elements of the public presentation”.

That the administration used the fear of WMDs and terrorism to fight a war for hegemony should be acknowledged by an American political establishment eager to rehabilitate George W Bush amid the rule of Donald Trump, not least because John Bolton, Trump’s national security adviser, seems eager to employ similar methods to similar ends in Iran.

Ahsan I Butt is an Associate Professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.