Showing posts with label BALCANI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BALCANI. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 27


Macedonian and Albanian leaders on Wednesday 27 welcomed the decision by European ministers to give a conditional green light to their EU accession talks.

“There will be sweat, tears and many disappointments but we will succeed!” Macedonian Foreign Minister Nikola Dimitrov wrote on Facebook.

“Now we will climb a mountain road, narrow and steep, marred by rain and ghastly wind, but we will succeed,” he added.

Macedonia’s Prime Minister Zoran Zaev said it was great news for the country and offered a major “motivation” for achieving a “European Macedonia”.

After a long debate on Tuesday among the bloc's European affairs ministers, it was decided that Albania and Macedonia’s EU accession talks will start in June next year, dependent on certain conditions being fulfilled.

The unexpected outcome, despite broad EU support, showed French President Emmanuel Macron’s determination to postpone the decision until after European Parliament elections in May, for fear of stoking anti-immigrant sentiment, diplomats said.

It also puts a brake on the momentum Germany and EU chief executive Jean-Claude Juncker had sought in the Western Balkans to counter Russian influence by offering six countries a path to EU membership.

EU governments will “set out the path towards accession negotiations in June 2019” for Macedonia and Albania, according to a document agreed by the bloc’s 28 Europe ministers at what diplomats said was a long, fraught meeting in Luxembourg.

“It was a very difficult birth,” Germany’s EU minister Michael Roth said of the compromise decision.

Germany, Austria, Sweden, Slovakia and many other EU countries had hoped for an agreement on Tuesday that would give clear approval for membership talks to start. EU leaders were due to have signed off at a summit on Thursday in Brussels.

Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia all hope to join the EU.

Membership talks are already underway with Serbia and Montenegro. Albania, which is NATO member, and Macedonia, which has reached an agreement to resolve a dispute over its name with Greece, had won the support of the European Commission, which recommended that membership talks be opened.

Even with the delay, Macedonia’s deputy prime minister for European Affairs, Bujar Osmani, said on Twitter his country was now “on the path to open the accession negotiations next June”.

Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama also hailed the ministers’ decision “after 72 hours of stormy debate” as a victory. “The results of our huge reforms finally led even the sceptics to accept that Albania and Macedonia are ready to negotiate,” Rama tweeted in English.

However, opposition leader Lulzim Basha said Albania would be turned away in a year if it did not fight crime and corruption.

Macron, backed by the Netherlands, has said the bloc must first reform itself before taking on new members, although EU diplomats say Paris is mainly concerned about anti-immigrant sentiment at home.

The rushed accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 and the poorly managed migration of eastern European workers to Britain, which turned many Britons against the European project, have made EU enlargement more difficult, officials say.

The Dutch parliament has approved opening EU membership talks with Macedonia after the agreement with Greece to change the country’s official name to Republic of North Macedonia. But the Dutch government was unwilling to move before France, diplomats said.

In their statement, EU ministers said both Albania and Macedonia needed to do more on judicial reforms, corruption and organised crime. Depending on progress next June and another report by the Commission, which oversees membership talks, EU governments could formally open negotiations by the end of next year.

Both countries have to show “a track record both in improving the rule of law and fighting organised crime”, Dutch Foreign Minister Stef Blok told reporters.

Many European countries, including Austria which will chair the EU rotating presidency from July, want to send a signal to Albania, Macedonia and other Western Balkan countries that the way to EU membership is still is open, especially as Macedonia looks set to be welcomed into the NATO alliance in July.Albanian PM Edi Rama said that "after 72 hours of stormy debate" the decision comes as a victory.

Albania and Macedonia hope the decision will clear the way for approval by EU leaders at a summit on June 28-29. EU enlargement commissioner Johannes Hahn said after the meeting that the decision was a “key signal to the region that progress is rewarded”.

While most of the EU's member states supported opening the accession talks immediately, France and the Netherlands opposed the move, saying they first wanted to see Macedonia and Albania sustain their reforms.

The two countries were given several key conditions to meet before starting the talks. They include judicial reforms, active investigations and verdicts in high-level corruption cases, reforms in the intelligence and security sectors and public administration reform.

Arguably the most important condition for Macedonia is the implementation of the recent ‘name’ deal with Greece, under which the country should change its name to the Republic of North Macedonia.

Thursday, June 8


BalkanInSight:. Not everything about Donald Trump is unpredictable. At least towards the Balkans, his policy so far has be­en entirely consistent in its general indifference.

Not only is the region irrelevant to his political programme, it’s also of marginal interest to the country he leads. No doubt Trump wants the best for the Balkans. But as the EU’s backyard, he would no doubt argue it’s a place where Europeans must take the lead.

So Florian Bieber shouldn’t be surprised that American policy toward the Balkans has not changed discernibly since Trump took office.

It’s business as usual on the ground as ambassadors press ahead with their civilising mission bringing democracy, justice and prosperity to the natives, guiding the region towards the sunlit uplands of the European Union, and clamping down on the nationalists who threaten to return the region to barbarity.

However, it would be wrong to conclude from all this that American policy towards the Balkans is set in stone. On the contrary, an important debate is beginning in the media and the political institutions about the United States’ approach to the region.

Bieber cites dissenting comments by the congressman and Chairman of the House’s Europe, Subcommittee Dana Rohrabacher and the security analyst John R. Schindler. He could have added those of the former Deputy Chief of the CIA’s Balkan Task Force, Steven Meyer. 

In my own country, the UK, an ex-ambassador to Belgrade, Ivor Roberts, has suggested a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo and another, Charles Crawford, has written about the ‘existential instability’ of the current regional settlement.

These comments have received extensive scrutiny from defenders of the current policy, generating a loud and vigorous online discussion.

The debate is also taking place outside the media glare. Various think tanks have been holding seminars that invite ‘blue skies’ thinking about international policy towards the Balkans. 

And after setting out my views in Foreign Affairs, I received a plethora of mail from individuals in the US who question its approach.

Florian Bieber dismisses those who advocate a change in policy as pipe-dreamers. But to do so is to misunderstand how foreign policy evolves over time.

As I discovered during my time as a diplomat, there is no document lying in a drawer which permanently defines a government’s policy towards the Balkans or any other region. 

Instead, policy is the product of a continuous dialogue within a specialist community encompassing officials, special advisers, intelligence analysts, parliamentarians, academics, think tankers, journalists and lobbyists who are actively monitoring and responding to events on the ground.

When the dialogue between these people begins to change, so, eventually, does the policy. Why, then, is the dialogue now changing?

It is not, I would suggest, because of the ‘void of no discernible Balkan policy’ created by Trump. In the absence of new instructions, the institutions are continuing to run with the policy from the Obama era: nationalist politicians have been sanctioned and sidelined, Montenegro has joined NATO, and so on. 

More precisely, the debate about the Balkans is changing because it’s increasingly clear to many observers that Western policy towards the region is just not working.

In its simplest form, the West has tried to nurture a durable peace in the Balkans by offering it the prospect of integration with NATO and the EU. This, it was hoped, would stabilise the region by guaranteeing its security and prosperity, and allowing divided nations to be reunited in a borderless Europe.

Twenty years on, however, reality falls far short of this ideal. Sometime during the last decade, the basic goal of peace in the region got lost as the EU insisted that weak and economically handicapped states meet an impossible number of political and technical conditions before they could be accepted as members.

Now the politics have turned against enlargement as the EU languishes in a state of apparently permanent crisis created by the intractable contradictions of the euro zone, differences over migration policy, and much more besides. In most EU countries, public opinion is hostile to further enlargement into the Balkans, whose problems can only add to the EU’s own.

This is having perverse effects in the region, where the failure of ‘Europeanisation’ is plunging almost every state into a political crisis of some kind, manifest in institutional paralysis, unrest on the streets, alienation from the political process and growing cynicism towards Western officials who appear to support any local leader who endorses Euro-Atlantic integration, regardless of their fitness for office.

As the promise of EU membership dies, people are instead investing their hopes and dreams in the nation, encouraged by corrupt politicians who are happy to champion nationalism to stay in power. Albanian leaders talk openly about the possibility of unifying their territory if they cannot join the EU. Macedonian protestors demonstrate against enhanced Albanian rights. 

A Serbian president threatens to go to war in Kosovo. Croatian politicians sing songs to Herzeg Bosnia.

Those who know the recent history of the Balkans should not be surprised by any of this. In different circumstances, the region is simply replaying the events of the 1980s when the failure of another ideological project, Titoist-style socialism, encouraged people to take refuge in the nation.

Not everyone, of course, has abandoned the European dream. Significant numbers still believe – in a triumph of hope over experience - that the mechanism of European integration can yet be made to work, just as many in the eighties believed that socialism could be revitalised.

But this belief relies on so much changing – a revival of the EU and eastward enlargement, an unprecedented drive at reform in the region, a decisive re-engagement by the United States and Russia’s willingness to stay out of the Balkans – that the chances of success are severely limited.

Since the existing policy is not working, and because the actual consequences are an uncontrolled rise in nationalism and civil unrest, various commentators are naturally coming forward with new suggestions for upholding stability in the Balkans that get beyond European integration.

For many, that means revisiting the question of borders. This is not because borders are the only problem in the region but because illegitimate borders - and everything that follows from them in terms of power, security, rights and opportunities - are the casus belli for any renewed inter-ethnic violence.

My own view is that the West should recognise the inevitability of a collapse of the ‘Post-Yugoslav settlement’ and switch its focus from trying to uphold something that cannot be preserved to managing its orderly undoing, with the end goal of establishing legitimate nation states.

This doesn’t mean the United States should charge in and carve up ostensibly peaceful countries in the manner of a nineteenth-century colonialist.

But it does mean that Western policymakers should generally support demands by minorities for greater devolution along national lines; accept closer cross-border cooperation between national kin; and stop promoting the ‘principle’ of multi-ethnicity, the main beneficiaries of which are opportunistic politicians who enrich themselves on the backs of people’s fears of what another national group will do to them.

Of course, nothing sufficiently dramatic has happened in the Balkans since Donald Trump came to power to compel the White House to take up these suggestions.

As I stated at the outset, policy continues to be run by local ambassadors who promote a theoretical process of European integration and leverage this to involve themselves in the nooks and crannies of their host countries’ domestic politics.

When things get out of control, as they did recently in Albania when the opposition boycotted the elections, or in Macedonia, where the president refused to give a mandate to a winning coalition, their superiors from the State Department fly in to bang local heads together.

All this is broadly in the American interest. For as long as these ambassadors and officials can keep a lid on things in the Balkans, they free up the president and the Secretary of State to focus on more urgent international problems such as Syria and North Korea.

However, this approach will be difficult to sustain into the next decade given the breakdown of the process of EU enlargement – the lynchpin of Western policy towards the Balkans – and growing instability in the region.

Whether a Serbian annexation of northern Kosovo or the de facto secession of minority groups like the Macedonian Albanians or Bosnian Serbs, some crisis will eventually become unmanageable by means of illusory enticements and emergency diplomacy.

At that point, unless the White House is willing to risk renewed conflict, it will be forced to re-engage with the Balkans, to think again about what the US is trying to achieve and how best to achieve it.

Will it insist forever on the preservation of arbitrary borders determined decades ago by a communist dictator in the face of profound local resistance? Or will it use its immense resources and diplomatic clout to engineer a durable solution that reflects demographic realities on the ground?

For the moment, all this is a matter of abstract debate within foreign policy circles. But the old assumptions about what the Balkans must and mustn’t be are now being scrutinised and re-examined from first principles, changing the intellectual environment in which policy is formulated.

Events will eventually force senior American policymakers to devise a new approach that catches up with political reality. While that may not be for some years, a debate about how to prevent a relapse into violence is already under way. As this debate progresses, it will lay the groundwork for that eventual check with reality to happen.

Saturday, May 27


Those "Reports" explores the Security challenges posed by foreign fighter returnees. It argues that—contrary to popular belief—most foreign fighters do not die on battlefields or travel from conflict to conflict

This means that Law Enforcement, Intelligence, and other Security Officials should expect unprecedented numbers of returnees from Afghanistan, Indonesia, Africa, Mali, Libya, Syria and Iraq should a ceasefire hold. 

The challenge posed by returnees is threefold: Recidivism rates are uncertain, law enforcement cannot manage the numbers of prospective returnees alone, and returnees from non-Western countries also pose a threat to the United States. 

Findings suggest that a global architecture should be put in place to mitigate the threats from foreign fighter returnees.

Thursday, May 4


(Steta Stari moj Dragi da si se potpun pogresio)

No country of people's democracy has so many nationalities as this country has. Only in Czechoslovakia do there exist two kindred nationalities, while in some of the other countries there are only minorities. Consequently in these countries of people's democracy there has been no need to settle such serious problems as we have had to settle here. With them the road to socialism is less complicated than is the case here. 

With them the basic factor is the class issue, with us it is both the nationalities and the class issue. The reason why we were able to settle the nationalities question so thoroughly is to be found in the fact that it had begun to be settled in a revolutionary way in the course of the Liberation War, in which all the nationalities in the country participated, in which every national group made its contribution to the general effort of liberation from the occupier according to its capabilities. 

Neither the Macedonians nor any other national group which until then had been oppressed obtained their national liberation by decree. They fought for their national liberation with rifle in hand. The role of the Communist Party lay in the first place in the fact that it led that struggle, which was a guarantee that after the war the national question would be settled decisively in the way the communists had conceived long before the war and during the war. 

The role of the Communist Party in this respect today, in the phase of building socialism, lies in making the positive national factors a stimulus to, not a brake on, the development of socialism in our country. The role of the Communist Party today lies in the necessity for keeping a sharp lookout to see that national chauvinism does not appear and develop among any of the nationalities. The Communist Party must always endeavour, and does endeavour, to ensure that all the negative phenomena of nationalism disappear and that people are educated in the spirit of internationalism. 

What are the phenomena of nationalism? Here are some of them: 1) National egoism, from which many other negative traits of nationalism are derived, as for example — a desire for foreign conquest, a desire to oppress other nations, a desire to impose economic exploitation upon other nations, and so on; 2) national-chauvinism which is also a source of many other negative traits of nationalism, as for example national hatred, the disparagement of other nations, the disparagement of their history, culture, and scientific activities and scientific achievements, and so on, the glorification of developments in their own history that were negative and which from our Marxist point of view are considered negative. 

 And what are these negative things? Wars of conquest are negative, the subjugation and oppression of other nations is negative, economic exploitation is negative, colonial enslavement is negative, and so on. All these things are accounted negative by Marxism and condemned. All these phenomena of the past can, it is true, be explained, but from our point of view they can never be justified. In a socialist society such phenomena must and will disappear. In the old Yugoslavia national oppression by the great-Serb capitalist clique meant strengthening the economic exploitation of the oppressed peoples. 

This is the inevitable fate of all who suffer from national oppression. In the new, socialist Yugoslavia the existing equality of rights for all nationalities has made it impossible for one national group to impose economic exploitation upon another. That is because hegemony of one national group over another no longer exists in this country. Any such hegemony must inevitably bring with it, to some degree or other, in one form or another, economic exploitation; and that would be contrary to the principles upon which socialism rests. 

Only economic, political, cultural, and universal equality of rights can make it possible for us to grow in strength in these tremendous endeavours of our community. Our sacrifices are terrible. I can safely say that there is no other part of the world which has been devastated on a vaster scale than Yugoslavia. Every tenth Yugoslav has perished in this struggle in which we were forced to wrest armaments from our enemies, to freeze without clothing, and to die without medication. Nevertheless our optimism and faith have proved justified. 

The greatest gain of this conflict between democracy and fascism lies in the fact that it has drawn together everything that was good in humanity. The unity of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain is the best guarantee to the peoples of the world that Nazi horrors will never again be repeated. (Tito)

Friday, February 10


RT- "Montenegro is being dragged into NATO at an accelerated and strengthened rate. Montenegro does not meet in any way the criteria of membership in the alliance, which were developed in the past," Kelin warned, adding the country's economy is currently in deplorable state while its armed forces are comprised of less than 2,000 military servicemen.

"The alliance gains nothing from making Montenegro a member, and it takes on one more security dependent that we already know won't pull its weight," Larison said. He noted that besides the fact that Podgorica adds "almost nothing to the Alliance," its NATO bid does not have broad support at home.

"It doesn't make sense to take in a new alliance member when there is no consensus in that country in favor of belonging to the alliance. 

NATO shouldn't be adding new members in any case, but it certainly shouldn't be taking in a country that doesn't have a majority behind the idea of joining," the US commentator noted.

In his article Hanna cited Senator Rand Paul who has recently raised concerns over a potential provocation against Russia.

"I think that many are referring to this as a provocation to Russia, and also, I think NATO is too big already," Paul said as quoted by the journalist, "Ultimately, joining NATO is not necessarily a benign thing."

"I look forward to welcoming Montenegro into the NATO Alliance and continuing to support its path towards further Euro-Atlantic integration," Senator John McCain said in an official statement commenting on the matter.

In the other side: "If we abstract from some media reports and statements, the attitude of the Russian Federation toward the further expansion of NATO to the east is well known. This attitude is negative," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters Tuesday. Peskov added that the Kremlin would abstain from commenting on media reports on Montenegro accession to NATO. He said that Moscow has not yet received any official statement on the matter from the Trump administration.

The fate of Montenegro's NATO membership is now in the hands of US President Donald Trump. While some US lawmakers continue to push ahead with Montenegro's accession to the alliance, others regard it as a potential provocation against Russia and argue that the Balkan country adds "almost nothing" to the bloc's security.

US National Security Adviser Michael Flynn may recommend President Donald Trump to back Montenegro's NATO membership, Andrew Hanna of reported on Monday, citing a senior administration official.

The journalist noted that twenty-three of 28 NATO member states have already voted in favor of Montenegro's bid. the United States, Canada, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands have yet to announce their decision. 

Meanwhile US lawmakers signaled their willingness to support Montenegro's NATO bid: the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted in favor of the treaty with the Balkan state on January 11, 2017.

"Because adding a nation to NATO is a treaty measure, support from two-thirds of senators is required to secure passage. But the Constitution delegates the power to negotiate treaties to the president and Trump could refuse to relay the ratification to NATO, indefinitely stalling the process," Hanna highlighted. 

It is no secret that NATO's eastward expansion, including the possible admission of Montenegro to the alliance, remains a sensitive issue for the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, on January 26 Montenegro's Prime Minister Dusko Markovic announced that Podgorica expects to become a full-fledged member of NATO before the next summit of the military alliance. However, national polls, cited by Hanna indicate that only 39.5 percent of Montenegrins favor the country's NATO membership while 39.7 percent oppose it.

Furthermore, according to Andrei Kelin, the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's European Cooperation Department, as of yet Montenegro has failed to meet the criteria for NATO membership.

"We were exposed to pressure aimed at blocking our accession to NATO, but we have resisted them due to the power of the state, its institutions, democracy and democratic principles," Markovic said in a reference to the opposition boycott, which he called "part of plans to destabilize Montenegro in political terms and disable it to become a member of NATO".

Sunday, October 11


Organizers and participants in the “Creating a Workable World” conference (held this weekend at the University of Minnesota) are undoubtedly sincere. No one wants to live in an unworkable world. 

The sponsoring World Federalist Movement has historically exercised a strong attraction on progressives, appealing to their generous sentiments and wish for world peace, as Coleen Rowley and Diana Johnstone, describe.

“Human rights” organizations have become purveyors of bloody chaos as they advocate Western big-power military attacks on weak countries in the name of “responsibility to protect” – one of several purportedly well- intentioned strategies gone awry such a grand, overarching ideal as world federalism or global democracy must be evaluated in light of current circumstances and its track record.

At the end of World War II, it was widely believed that nationalism was the main cause of the horrors that had just devastated much of the world. It was easy to imagine that abolishing nation states would be a step toward ending wars by removing their cause. 

This sentiment was particularly strong in Western Europe, forming the ideological foundation of the movement that led to European integration, now embodied in the European Union. In that same period, there was a historic movement going in the opposite direction: the national liberation movements in various colonized countries of the Third World

The political drive for national liberation from European powers —Britain, France, the Netherlands— contributed to establishing national sovereignty as the foundation of world peace, by outlawing aggression

Newly liberated Third World countries felt protected by the principle of national sovereignty, seeing it as essential to independence and even to survival. But today, 70 years after the end of World War II, experience has provided lessons in the practice of these two contrary ideals: supranational governance and national sovereignty

Not surprisingly, the official voices of the hegemonic world power and its allies tend to cite internal conflicts, especially in weaker Third World countries, as proof that national sovereignty must be violated in order to defend “human rights” and bring democracy. The danger from “genocide” has even become an official U.S.-NATO pretext for advocating and launching military intervention. With disastrous results

It’s therefore not surprising that Workable World’s keynote speaker, W. Andy Knight, was a supporter of the infamous regime-change war that virtually destroyed Libya, under the guise, paradoxically, of the U.S. and NATO’sresponsibility to protect.” 

That is not just a side issue: It signals the dirty business of wars and regime-change intrigues currently underway behind the scholarly façade of “global governance”. We fear that opposing arguments in favor of national sovereignty will probably not be discussed much during this conference. 

And yet, the European Union has served as an experimental laboratory testing what happens when a large and growing number (now 28) of sovereign states turns over a major part of their rights to supranational governance. Unified institutionally, the weaker members find themselves dominated by the powerful

Despite decades of speeches proclaiming that “we are all Europeans,” when it comes to the crunch, people revert radically to their national identity. Germans resent Greeks for being debtors; Greeks resent Germans for keeping them in debt

All the more so in that there is no way out. Elections are increasingly meaningless within the member states, because major economic decisions are taken essentially in Brussels, by the E.U. institutionsThis is causing increasing disillusionment and de-politicization in Europe

Europeans take virtually no interest in the European Parliament. They do not feel represented by it, and indeed they are not. Democracy works best in small circumscriptions: Greek city states, Iceland, villages. 

The bigger it gets, the less “democratic” it can be. Half a century ago, the functioning ideal was to bring eternal peace to Europe through unity. Today, that institutional unity is creating new divisions and hostility

To put it simply, experience is in the process of killing the ideal and showing why “worldwide parliamentary democracy” may bring more harm than good, at least in the real world as it exists today and will for some time to come.

Wednesday, August 26


Eliseo Bertolasi scrive che "Il controllo della NATO sull’Europa orientale è quasi completo. Fuori dall’Alleanza sono rimasti solo pochi paesi, tra questi: la Serbia, il Montenegro, la Macedonia.

Tutti tre questi paesi sono accumunati dal fatto: d’essere slavi, ortodossi, e di provare forti simpatie per la Russia. Mentre Montenegro e Macedonia hanno da tempo espresso il loro desiderio di diventare membri della NATO, la Serbia ha dimostrato di essere più refrattaria.

I serbi non hanno dimenticato la guerra con la NATO del 1999 che provocò la morte di tanti civili innocenti. L’opinione pubblica non ha mai mostrato simpatie per la NATO, pertanto Belgrado in passato ha dichiarato la sua neutralità e il rifiuto d’aderire ad alleanze militari. 

Ora in Serbia le posizioni non sono così univoche e chiare e l’orientamento di una parte considerevole della sua classe politica non sembra coincidere con una fetta importante dell’opinione pubblica.

Del resto l’Occidente, con Stati Uniti in testa, ambisce a “strappare” il Paese dall’influenza russa esercitando pressioni molto forti. Washington, fiduciosa che il Paese entrerà nella NATO, sottolinea costantemente che per la Serbia le porte dell’Alleanza Atlantica sono già aperte.

Specie dopo l’avvicinamento progressivo alla UE che rafforza la tendenza a perseguire aspirazioni euro-atlantiche.

L’attuale leadership serba sembra mantenersi in un difficile equilibrio tra il desiderio di compiacere l’Occidente e gli umori dell’opinione pubblica del Paese non senza il rischio di ambiguità.  

Se la situazione in Serbia appare però ancora incerta, non è altrettanto incerta in Montenegro. La NATO, definendolo “candidato perfetto” è già pronta a includere il Montenegro al suo interno.

Podgorica ha intrapreso il cammino di adesione verso la NATO già dal 2010, per ottenere subito dopo lo status di “paese candidato” ed è probabile che riceverà l’invito ufficiale d’adesione nel mese di dicembre 2015 alla riunione dei ministri degli Esteri dell’UE.

Tuttavia, non va dimenticato che solo l’anno scorso il Montenegro declinò l’invito d’entrare nell’Alleanza: innanzi tutto non aveva ancora terminato la riforma del settore difesa, in secondo luogo, nell’opinione pubblica prevalevano ancora gli oppositori verso l’adesione. 

Le autorità montenegrine sperano che l’eventuale entrata nell’Alleanza non influenzerà le loro relazioni con la Russia. 

Mosca, a tal proposito, invece, si è già pronunciata esprimendo il proprio dissenso; il rappresentante permanente della Russia presso la NATO Alexander Gruško nel corso di una videoconferenza organizzata da “Rossija Segodnja” ha dichiarato: “In modo univoco questo è un passo negativo per la Sicurezza europea e per le nostre relazioni con il Montenegro, perché, palesemente, si tratta di un Paese a noi strettamente legato da legami storici, comunanza spirituale, relazioni umane… che aderisce a un’organizzazione, per usare un eufemismo, ostile nei rapporti con la Russia”.

La questione principale rimane però aperta, ossia, la possibilità che il territorio montenegrino arrivi presto a ospitare basi militari NATO.

In Russia su questo tema i pareri sono discordanti. Il vice direttore dell’Istituto di analisi politica e militare Aleksandr Chramčichin, senza destare allarmismo, sostiene:  “Se anche queste basi dovessero mai comparire, saranno comunque abbastanza lontane”.

Altri esperti ritengono che l’entrata del Montenegro nella NATO rappresenti persino una condizione favorevole per la Russia, dal momento che nell’Alleanza ci sarà un Paese di più, in buoni rapporti con Mosca.

Non tutti però in Russia sono d’accordo con queste posizioni ottimistiche. Il vice direttore della commissione per gli affari internazionali della Duma Leonid Kalašnikov ritiene che tale mossa sia invece finalizzata a isolare la forte influenza della Serbia su Podgorica

Secondo questa prospettiva che giustifica un certo allarmismo, il Montenegro potrebbe presto trasformarsi in un’importante testa di ponte per gli americani in una zona geopoliticamente delicata come lo scacchiere mediterraneo

Al di là delle varie prospettive è indiscutibile che l’adesione del Montenegro all’Alleanza influenzerà gli equilibri tra NATO e Russia. Ma cosa dovrà aspettarsi la Russia da questo passo? Ci saranno minacce nei suoi confronti? 

A queste domande Konstantin Sivkov , membro-corrispondente dell’Accademia russa delle scienze missilistiche e d’artiglieria, abbozza una risposta: “Per valutare il significato dell’entrata del Montenegro nella NATO, è sufficiente dare un’occhiata a una mappa: il Paese ha uno sbocco sul Mar Adriatico, in altre parole, potrà ospitare una base militare navale. Oggi la NATO è più indispensabile agli Stati Uniti di quanto non lo sia per l’Europa”.

Tuttavia, in Europa esiste anche un’opposizione patriottica, ci sono diversi partiti e movimenti che si muovono a favore del ripristino della sovranità dei Paesi europei. 

Germania e Francia, in molti casi, non hanno approvato la strategia di Washington sulla scena internazionale.

È stato evidente nel 2003 con la guerra in Iraq. Nonostante questi Paesi siano ormai delle palesi marionette americane, ci sono comunque buone probabilità che altre forze politiche arriveranno al potere

Queste non seguiranno la corrente della politica americana in modo univoco, ma, soprattutto, porteranno avanti una propria linea, in forte contrasto con gli interessi statunitensi.

Gli Stati Uniti all’interno della NATO hanno rafforzato la propria influenza nei Paesi dell’Europa orientale guidati da governi decisamente filo-americani, pronti ad accettare la presenza di truppe americane e tra questi vi è il Montenegro

Tutte le operazioni militari nel teatro del Mediterraneo occupano una posizione sicuramente importante. Per gli Stati Uniti, il Montenegro potrebbe fungere questo da  “aeroporto di riserva” qualora ci fossero tensioni con l’Italia.

Il Montenegro non è mai stato un partner cruciale per la Russia e di reali legami economici, fatta eccezione per il turismo, c’è ne sono sempre stati pochi. La sua adesione alla NATO non condizionerà il turismo e sotto l’aspetto economico l’adesione è irrilevante.

Ma se in Serbia e in altri Paesi balcanici prenderà corpo un sentimento anti-americano, allora in questo caso il Montenegro diventerà un importante punto d’appoggio, dal quale gli Stati Uniti potranno reprimere questi dissensi con la loro forza militare”.

Sempre Sivkov è del parere che siano stati gli ultimi eventi in Grecia a determinare la spinta definitiva per la convergenza del Montenegro verso la NATO, sostiene infatti: “se la Grecia dovesse lasciare la zona euro sarebbe elevato anche il rischio di una sua uscita dall’UE". 

Rifiutando il diktat dei funzionari di Bruxelles per il suo sviluppo economico, ad Atene non rimarrà altro che orientarsi verso Mosca e Pechino, poiché non avrà più senso contare sull’aiuto da parte di Washington e Bruxelles (creditori). 

La Grecia diventerà un anello debole nella NATO, quindi, in prospettiva, si può ipotizzare una sua possibile uscita dall’Alleanza. In tal caso verrebbe danneggiato il fianco sud della NATO, con la Turchia in isolamento geopolitico.

È per tal ragione che gli americani hanno ora bisogno di un nuovo punto d’appoggio in Montenegro, in particolare per rafforzare il blocco della NATO nel sud. 

Thursday, July 9


Macedonia is reeling from two shocks. Amid a scandal over leaked wiretaps revealing a state apparatus captured and corrupted by the leading party, a battle in ethnically mixed Kumanovo between police and ethnic-Albanian gunmen, many from Kosovo, caused the region’s worst loss of life in a decade. 

Unless addressed urgently, the double crisis (government legitimacy/regional security) carries risk that could extend to violent confrontation, perhaps in worst case to elements of the conflict narrowly averted in 2001. 

Discredited national institutions cannot cope alone. The opposition has broken off talks on a European Union (EU) mediated deal between parties for reforms and early elections that deadlocked, substantially over whether the prime minister, in power since 2006, must resign and the time a transitional government would need to level the field. 

The EU must press for a comprehensive agreement addressing the state capture and alleged corruption, including independent investigation and monitoring with international help. 

Macedonia and Kosovo, also with aid, should jointly investigate Kumanovo.

In February 2015, the main opposition party began publishing excerpts from what it said was an illegal wiretap program leaked by unidentified persons. 

The massive surveillance, from at least 2010 to 2014, seems to have targeted thousands, including nearly all top opposition and government officials, as well as ambassadors and media figures. 

The fraction of published wiretaps focus on what appear to be conversations of senior government persons plotting to subvert elections, manipulating courts, controlling a nominally independent press and punishing enemies. Many who should be responsible for dealing with apparent illegalities are themselves implicated.

In the midst of this crisis, a police raid in Kumanovo on 9 May found a heavily armed group of ethnic Albanians, including former liberation army fighters from Kosovo

By the time fighting died down the next day, a multi-ethnic neighbourhood was destroyed, eight police were dead and 37 wounded; fourteen gunmen were dead and about 30 in custody. 

Top Macedonian and Kosovo officials had advance knowl­edge of at least some of the group’s activities, but much remains worryingly obscure, including its plans in Macedonia, possible allies on both sides of the border and many details of the police operation.

The incident did not spark ethnic conflict. Ethnic Albanians, roughly a quarter of the population, deeply resent what they perceive to be their second-class status and unequal treatment in a state dominated by ethnic Macedonians. 

They had expected more from the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) that ended the incipient civil war and was meant to give them a power-sharing role in a unitary state. 

For now, there is little constituency for fighting. While the inter-ethnic peace has proven resilient, however, further wiretap releases or a new deadly incident could raise the risk quotient unpredictably.

Macedonia appeared for a time to be building a modern, transparent state and integrating its ethnic-Albanian community, but that progress has ceased, even reversed, at least since a 2008 Greek veto resulting from the two countries’ eccentric dispute over the republic’s name blocked the prospect of EU and NATO integration indefinitely. 

The wiretaps, which appear to illustrate that governing parties have entrenched their power and privileges through corruption and criminality, have also dramatically compromised the ruling coalition’s ethnic-Albanian partner

Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, who has denied any wrongdoing, and opposition leader Zoran Zaev are playing high-stakes poker at the EU-sponsored talks, while some of the tens of thousands of activists who held duelling political rallies in the centre of Skopje in May remain encamped outside government and parliament buildings.

The EU, which has a direct stake in the threat to regional stability and a responsibility to assist a country right itself to which it has granted membership candidacy status, should redouble efforts to persuade Macedonia’s leaders to restore trust in government by reaching an inter-party agreement that commits to:

establishing through normal parliamentary procedures an interim government with appropriate membership of all main parties, whose main task should be to implement reforms necessary for credible elections by April 2016 (two years early), especially those related to voter lists, equal media access and abuse of office for partisan purposes:
1. adopting a law in parliament establishing two independent commissions (“A” and “B”), both with authority to request and receive active expert help from the EU, U.S. and others. The mandate of “A” should be to assist with and monitor the transitional government’s efforts with respect to preparing credible early elections; The mandate of “B” should be to deal with the wiretaps, including investigation into the crimes and corruption they appear to show;
2. accepting that the transitional government will remain in office and early elections will not be held unless Commission “A” determines that benchmarks have been met, and implementation is sufficiently advanced;
3. working to improve implementation of the OFA by ensuring equal representation of ethnic Albanians at all levels of public office; a fair share of government investment in ethnic-Albanian areas; and respect for language equality.

The inter-party agreement should further commit Macedonia’s leaders to:

1. seek a joint Macedonia-Kosovo investigation into the Kumanovo incident, with expert assistance from EU and U.S. agencies, in order to improve the security situation and prevent future attacks; 
2. improve bilateral relations with Kosovo, for example by holding regular joint cabinet meetings and cooperating on border monitoring.

Friday, May 29


Ray McGovern. As American politicians and editorial writers resume their tough talk about sending more U.S. troops into Iraq, they are resurrecting the “successful surge” myth, the claim that President George W. Bush’s dispatch of 30,000 more soldiers in 2007 somehow “won” the war a storyline that is beloved by the neocons because it somewhat lets them off the hook for starting the disaster in the first place.

But just because Official Washington embraces a narrative doesn’t make it true. Bush’s “surge” was, in reality, a dismal - an unconscionable - failure. It did not achieve its ostensible aim  the rationale Bush eventually decided to give it - namely, to buy time for Iraq’s Sunnis and Shiites to reconcile.

Rather, it did just the opposite, greatly exacerbating antagonisms between them. That result was clearly predicted before the “surge” by none other than Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, top U.S. military leaders, and even the Washington Establishment-heavy Iraq Study Group, all of which were pressing for less -not more- military involvement.

In one very important sense, however, the “surge” into Iraq was wildly successful in achieving what was almost certainly its primary aim. It bought President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney a “decent interval” so they could leave office without an explicit military defeat sullying their legacy and for the “acceptable” price of “only” 1,000 more U.S. dead.

At the time there were other options – and indeed many of the “achievements” credited to the “surge” had already happened or at least had begun. The hyper-violent Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006; ethnic cleansing was separating Sunni and Shiite communities; and the Sunni Awakening – the buying off of some tribal leaders – was being implemented.

Yet, by fall 2006 it also was unavoidably clear that a new course had to be chosen and implemented in Iraq, and virtually every sober thinker seemed opposed to sending more troops. The senior military, especially CENTCOM commander Gen. John Abizaid and his man on the ground in Iraq, Gen. George Casey, emphasized that sending still more U.S. troops to Iraq would simply reassure leading Iraqi politicians that they could relax and continue to take forever to get their act together.

Here, for example, is Gen. Abizaid’s answer at the Senate Armed Services Committee on Nov. 15, 2006, to Sen. John McCain, who had long been pressing vigorously for sending 20,000 more troops to Iraq:

“Senator McCain, I met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the corps commander, General Dempsey, we all talked together. And I said, ‘in your professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq?’ And they all said no. And the reason is because we want the Iraqis to do more. It is easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future.”

The U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, sent a classified cable to Washington warning that “proposals to send more U.S. forces to Iraq would not produce a long-term solution and would make our policy less, not more, sustainable,” according to a New York Times retrospective on the “surge” by Michael R. Gordon published on Aug. 31, 2008. Khalilzad was arguing, unsuccessfully, for authority to negotiate a political solution with the Iraqis.

There was also the establishment-heavy Iraq Study Group, created by Congress and led by Republican stalwart James Baker and Democrat Lee Hamilton. After months of policy review during 2006 – with former CIA Director Robert Gates as a member – it issued a final report on Dec. 6, 2006, that began with the ominous sentence “The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.”

It called for: “A change in the primary mission of U.S. Forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly… By the first quarter of 2008 … all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.” Though a member of the Iraq Study Group, Gates quietly disassociated himself from its findings when Bush was dangling the position of Defense Secretary in front of the always ambitious Gates. After Nov. 8, 2006 when Bush announced Gates’s nomination, Gates quit the ISG.

Gates would do what he needed to do to become secretary of defense. At his confirmation hearing on Dec. 5, he obscured his opinions by telling the Senate Armed Services only “all options are on the table in terms of Iraq.” The Democrats, including then-Sen. Hillary Clinton, swooned over Gates’s supposed thoughtfulness and wisdom.

Many Democrats assumed that Gates would help persuade Bush to implement the ISG’s plan for a troop drawdown, but they were in for a surprise. With unanimous Democratic support and only two conservative Republicans opposed, Gates was confirmed by the full Senate on Dec. 6, the same day the ISG report was formally released. But the Democrats and much of the mainstream media had completely misread the behind-the-scenes story.

The little-understood reality behind Bush’s decision to catapult Robert Gates into his Pentagon perch was the astonishing fact that previous Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, of all people, was pulling a Robert McNamara; he was going wobbly on a war based largely on his own hubris-laden, misguided advice. In the fall of 2006 Rumsfeld was having a reality attack. In Rumsfeld-speak, he came face to face with a “known known.”

On Nov. 6, 2006, a day before the mid-term elections, Rumsfeld sent a memo to the White House, in which he acknowledged, “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.”

The rest of his memo sounded very much like the emerging troop-drawdown conclusions of the Iraq Study Group. The first 80 percent of Rumsfeld’s memo addressed “Illustrative Options,” including his preferred – or “above the line” – options such as “an accelerated drawdown of U.S. bases … to five by July 2007″ and withdrawal of U.S. forces “from vulnerable positions — cities, patrolling, etc. … so the Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.”

Finally, Rumsfeld had begun to listen to his generals and others who knew which end was up. The hurdle? Bush and Cheney were not about to follow Rumsfeld’s example in “going wobbly.” Like Robert McNamara at a similar juncture during Vietnam, Rumsfeld had to be let go before he caused a U.S. president to “lose a war.”

Waiting in the wings, though, was Robert Gates, who had been dispatched into a political purgatory after coming under suspicion of lying during the Iran-Contra scandal as Ronald Reagan’s deputy CIA director. Though President George H. W. Bush pushed through Gates’s nomination to be CIA director in 1991, Gates was sent packing by President Bill Clinton in 1993.

The elder Bush bailed Gates out again by getting him appointed as president of Texas A&M in College Station, Texas, the site of Bush’s presidential library. But Gates began his Washington rehabilitation with a spot on the Iraq Study Group. While on the ISG, he evidenced no disagreement with its emerging conclusions – at least not until Bush asked him to become Secretary of Defense in early November 2006. Rumsfeld had outlived his usefulness.

And, because of Official Washington’s famous forgetfulness, Gates was remembered not as a conniving and deceptive CIA bureaucrat, but as a “wise man” who was seen as a restraining emissary sent by the senior George Bush to rein in his impetuous son.

Easing the going-wobbly Rumsfeld off the stage was awkward. Right up to the week before the mid-term elections on Nov. 7, 2006, President Bush insisted that he intended to keep Rumsfeld in place for the next two years. Suddenly, however, the President had to confront Rumsfeld’s apostasy favoring a drawdown of U.S. troops from Iraq.

Rumsfeld had let reality get to him, together with the very strong anti-surge protestations by all senior uniformed officers save one — the ambitious Gen. David Petraeus, who had jumped on board for the “surge” escalation following the advice of his favorite neocon theorists, including Frederick Kagan.

With the bemedaled Petraeus in the wings and pro-surge guidance from Kagan and retired Gen. Jack Keane, all the White House needed was a new Pentagon chief who could be counted on to take Rumsfeld’s place and do the White House’s bidding. (If the names Kagan and Keane sound somewhat familiar, would you believe that they are now playing on President Barack Obama’s Bush-like aversion to losing a war on his watch, and are loudly and unashamedly promoting the idea of yet another “surge” into Iraq?)

On Nov. 5, 2006, Bush had a one-on-one with Gates in Crawford, Texas, and the deal was struck. Forget the torturously hammered-out recommendations of the Iraq Study Group; forget what the military commanders and even Rumsfeld were saying. Gates suddenly found the “surge” an outstanding idea. Well, not really. That’s just what he let Bush believe. (While “chameleon” is the word most often used for Gates by those who knew him at the CIA, Melvin Goodman, who worked with Gates in the branch I led on Soviet Foreign Policy uses the best label — “windsock.”)

Gates is second to none — not even Petraeus — in ambition and self-promotion. It is a safe bet he wanted desperately to be Secretary of Defense, to be back at center stage in Washington after nearly 14 years in exile from the big show.

He quickly agreed to tell Gen. Abizaid to retire; offer Gen. Casey a sinecure as Army chief of staff, providing he kept his mouth shut; and to eagle-scout his way through Senate confirmation with the help of pundits like David Ignatius composing panegyrics in honor of Gates, the “realist.”

So relieved were the senators to be rid of the hated-but-feared Rumsfeld that the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Dec. 5, 2006, on Gates’s nomination had the aura of a pajama party (I was there). Gates told the senators bedtime stories – and vowed to show “great deference to the judgment of generals.”

That “deference” included Gates dumping Abizaid and Casey. But the administration faltered embarrassingly in coming up with a reasonable rationale to “justify” the surge, especially in the face of so much on-the-ground advice opposing the troop increase. And, the truth wouldn’t work either. You couldn’t really say: “We’re trading the lives of U.S. troops for a politically useful ‘decent interval.’”

On Dec. 20, 2006, President Bush told the Washington Post that he was “inclined to believe we do need to increase our troops, the Army and Marines.” He added, tellingly, “There’s got to be a specific mission that can be accomplished with the addition of more troops,” adding that he would look to Gates, just back from a quick trip to Baghdad, to help explain.

By way of preliminary explanation for the “surge,” President Bush wandered back and forth between “ideological struggle” to “sectarian violence.” He told the Post, “I’m going to keep repeating this over and over again, that I believe we’re in an ideological struggle” and, besides, “sectarian violence [is] obviously the real problem we face.”

When it became clear that those dogs wouldn’t hunt, the White House justified the “surge” as necessary to give Iraqi government leaders “breathing space” to work out their differences. That was the rationale offered by Bush in a major address on Jan 10, 2007. Pulling out all the stops, he also raised the specter of another 9/11 and, of course, spoke of the “decisive ideological struggle of our time.”

Taking a slap at his previous generals, the ISG and the wobbly Rumsfeld, Bush dismissed those who “are concerned that the Iraqis are becoming too dependent on the United States” and those whose “solution is to scale back America’s efforts in Baghdad — or announce a phased withdrawal of our combat forces.”

The President did warn that the year ahead would be “bloody and violent, even if our strategy works.” He got that part right. One would be tempted to laugh at Bush’s self-absorption — and Gates’s ambition — were we not talking about the completely unnecessary killing of over 1,000 U.S. troops and the brutalization of other U.S. soldiers — not to mention the slaughter of thousands of Iraqis.

In reality, by throwing 30,000 additional troops into Iraq, Bush and Cheney got two years of breathing room as they wound down their administration and some political space to snipe at their successors who inherited the Iraq mess.

But what about the thousand-plus U.S. troops killed during the “surge”? The tens of thousand of Iraqis? The hundreds of thousands displaced from their homes in the Baghdad area alone? I fear the attitude was this: Nobody would get killed, just a bunch of Iraqis and GIs mostly from small-town and inner-city America. And, anyway, our soldiers and Marines all volunteered, didn’t they?

Bush, Cheney and Gates apparently deemed it a small price to pay for enabling them to blame a successor administration for the inevitable withdrawal from America’s first large-scale war of aggression. I have known Gates for 45 years; he has always been transparently ambitious, but he is also bright. He knew better; and he did it anyway.

While those tactical machinations and political calculations were underway, Col. W. Patrick Lang, USA (retired), and I wrote a piece on Dec. 20, 2006, in which we exposed the chicanery and branded such a “surge” strategy “nothing short of immoral, in view of the predicable troop losses and the huge number of Iraqis who would meet violent injury and death.”

Surprisingly, we were joined by Sen. Gordon Smith, R-Oregon, who explained to ABC’s George Stephanopoulos why Smith said on the Senate floor that U.S. policy on Iraq may be “criminal.” “You can use any adjective you want, George. But I have long believed that in a military context, when you do the same thing over and over again without a clear strategy for victory, at the expense of your young people in arms, that is dereliction. That is deeply immoral.”

Thursday, May 21


Oggi la scommessa dei tecnocrati e dei registi dei colpi di stato è stata fatta sui nazionalisti, radicali, estremisti e terroristi. La protesta contro le politiche liberiste dell'élite sociale possono, però,  ripercuotersi contro lo stesso Stato.

Sebbene l'esempio molto realistico dell'Ucraina mostri cosa succede quando lo Stato collassa (non siamo lontani dalla Jugoslavia o Libia), il nocciolo della questione sta nel fatto che i fattori esterni assicurano la stabilità sociale e politica. Il "fattore di comprensione" interno che fornisce la reale resistenza della società alle sfide esterne e alle tecnologie di manipolazione, rimane nel suo stato embrionale e casuale.

La nomina di John Tefft ad ambasciatore degli Stati Uniti in Russia è stata percepita come un possibile passo verso la destabilizzazione della situazione in Russia e in Eurasia nel suo complesso. 

A differenza di Michael McFaul, Tefft è considerato pragmatico e regista delle rivoluzioni colorate nell'ex Unione Sovietica. Sarà a tal proposito effettuato un nuovo tentativo di rivoluzione colorata in Russia e in che forma? 

Rispondere a questa domanda è impossibile senza analizzare e comprendere l'evoluzione della stessa tecnologia delle rivoluzioni colorate, che hanno cessato di essere non violente, così come degli strumenti mediatici della moderna guerra umanitaria e d'informazione.

La destabilizzazione della situazione in Russia è di natura globale, l'impatto si sentirà nell'Unione Economica Eurasiatica (Bielorussia e Kazakistan), nonché creerà turbolenze nei Paesi BRICS. 

I media e la parte affaristica dell'élite saranno solo una delle sue guide, così la comprensione delle tecnologie descritte sopra è estremamente importante per l'analisi degli eventi futuri.

Le tecnologie di distruzione, che saranno attuate dopo il 2014, possono essere suddivise in due tipi, o meglio "fasi", che non sono necessariamente conseguenti ma si completano perfettamente a vicenda:

1) Gli Stati Uniti amano agire come modello, fino a quando lo scenario favorevole non scomparirà completamente. Ricordiamo che Tefft dal 2005 al 2009 è stato ambasciatore in Georgia e poi in Ucraina dal 2009 al 2013. A questo proposito prenderanno di nuovo vita la "rivoluzione dei nastri bianchi" e lo scenario di Piazza Bolotnaya del 2011-2012. Riprenderanno con rinnovato vigore le proteste "di carnevale", ci sarà una seconda ondata di "separatismo creativo", manifestazioni di protesta, folcloristiche, ecc…

2) Come mostra la prassi delle rivoluzioni colorate sopra riportate, il carnevale e la protesta simbolica hanno cessato di avere significato. Se gli scontri con la polizia a Mosca nel 2012 erano stati solo un episodio di manifestazioni di protesta, ora diventeranno un fine, verranno alla ribalta non con un nuova simbolica, ma con forme più selvagge di un'identità negativa.

Per la Russia il fenomeno delle rivoluzioni colorate è iniziato ed è entrato nell'agenda politica e sociale con la "rivoluzione arancione" a Kiev nel 2004. Proprio la rivoluzione "arancione" ha formato per la società russa l'immagine di una rivoluzione colorata e per molto tempo ha determinato la relazione verso questo fenomeno.

Nonostante le rivoluzioni colorate si fossero verificate prima (la "rivoluzione delle rose" in Georgia nel 2003) e dopo la "rivoluzione arancione" (due rivoluzioni in Kirghizistan: "dei tulipani" o "dei limoni" e "dei meloni") nel 2005 mentre nel 2010 la "seconda rivoluzione dei meloni"(o "popolare"), proprio Kiev è diventato per la Russia il punto di partenza per l'utilizzo di nuove tecnologie politiche, sociali ed umanitarie

Proprio allora si è costituita l'idea dell'universalità e dell'onnipotenza delle rivoluzioni colorate. L'immagine non violenta e "di velluto" delle rivoluzioni colorate già da molto tempo non corrisponde più alla realtà

Le stesse denominazioni simboliche, che si formano sulla base del marchio di fabbrica (simboli e colori) delle proteste sono diventate una formalità. Molto spesso le rivoluzioni non hanno una sola identità.

Molti nomi hanno le rivoluzioni del 2010 e 2011 in Tunisia: "dei gelsomini", "dei datteri", "della fame", "della baguette", mentre in Egitto "dei meloni", "di Twitter", "dei giovani", "della senape", "dei resort" "delle piramidi", "dei datteri". 

I media si perdono nei nomi, a dimostrazione dell'atteggiamento cinico verso questi marcatori da parte dei loro committenti.

Se si guarda alla storia delle rivoluzioni colorate, diventa evidente la loro natura radicale (ad esempio i tentativi di rivoluzione colorata in Bielorussia nel 2006 e in Moldavia nel 2009). 

L'ultimo tassello "cronologico" sul mito della pacifica rivoluzione civile non lo ha messo nemmeno l'Ucraina durante Euromaidan tra il 2013 e 2014, ma la Thailandia. 

In Thailandia le proteste si sono sviluppate con il classico scenario delle rivoluzioni colorate. Le immagini delle proteste a Bangkok nel 2009 hanno riprodotto e fatto ricordare la rivoluzione "arancione" di Kiev nel 2004. Tuttavia, a partire dal 2013, a Bangkok sono iniziati nuovi scontri di piazza e l'escalation del conflitto civile è terminata solo dopo il colpo di stato militare.

Gli eventi del 2014 di "Euromaidan" non sono stati una deviazione dallo scenario pacifico, ma l'attuazione tecnica di un piano per un colpo di stato. La rivoluzione colorata è finita come tecnologia non violenta del rovesciamento del potere, tuttavia il suo "appeal" positivo funziona ancora.

L'imballaggio simbolico ed informativo rimane un elemento importante del supporto dei media e permette di attribuire ad un banale colpo di stato una forma attraente e nobile di protesta civile. Soprattutto la forma esterna, in assenza di comprensione del reale contenuto, ha così appassionato l'attiva società russa: la classe creativa, gli intellettuali, l'imprenditoria e le elite.

Le rivoluzioni colorate sono precedute da una seria preparazione, causata della necessità di formare la percezione di un'immagine negativa delle autorità al potere

Nei riguardi della Russia la fase preparatoria è già iniziata ed è legata con il contesto globale e con i processi nei quali la Russia emerge come centro alternativo di potere.

Un esempio di fase aperta della guerra d'informazione è lo schianto del "Boeing" malese in Ucraina. I media occidentali sono usciti con accuse perentorie contro la Russia e personali contro Vladimir Putin, molto prima dei risultati dell'inchiesta ufficiale. 

È stata creata e lanciata l'immagine inquietante di "assassino" e "nemico".

Lo scopo delle tecnologie moderne dei media è la demonizzazione del nemico e la sua disumanizzazione. Infatti la guerra con il "male" giustifica la guerra stessa e le sue vittime.

Un altro obiettivo altrettanto importante della guerra d'informazione sono la distruzione e l'isolamento della percezione critica dell'informazione da parte dell'opinione pubblica. 

I media costruiscono una coscienza acritica e frammentata. Per questo sono costruite le cosiddette reti di contraffazione che sostituiscono le notizie.

Così sono fabbricate le notizie dei media occidentali, ad esempio sono ricordate da tutti le "immagini" della guerra dell'8 agosto 2008, quando il bombardamento di Tskhinvali da parte dei lanciarazzi georgiani "Grad" era stato venduto come un attacco dell'esercito russo

Durante la guerra in Libia, i media hanno dovuto inscenare servizi speciali dal Qatar. Quasi tutte le notizie ucraine si basano su falsi e messe in scena.

Nonostante la primitività di queste tecniche, l'opinione pubblica ci crede, le foto o i video accompagnati dalla firma appropriata hanno per la società moderna il valore di prove documentali. Ma la cosa che fa più paura è che l'immagine mediatica può servire da vero motivo per l'invasione e la guerra.

Le tecnologie colorate nella loro parte di comunicazione saranno efficaci fino a quando la società degli Stati-vittima avrà cognizione della realtà politica, sociale ed economica attraverso categorie mentali unidimensionali introdotte attraverso un complesso sistema di moderno modellizzazione sociale

Lo smarrimento dell'opinione pubblica si crea grazie ad un basso livello di pensiero critico, così come all'ingiustizia sociale e alla disuguaglianza, che vengono utilizzate come motivo fondante delle proteste.